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1 Many thanks to the members of PRIF’s research group ‘International Organization, Democratic Peace and the Rule
of Law’ and the participants of PRIF’s Annual Conference ‘Democracy, Diversity, and Conflict’ that was held in co-
operation with the Peace Studies Program of Cornell University on 10–11 October 2005 in Frankfurt, Germany for
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2 One might argue that it is too early to speak of democratic consolidation with regard to Georgia, but since demo-
cratic rules have already been formally introduced, we can say that the process of consolidation started with the
adoption of the 1995 constitution.
3 Approximately 100 ethnic groups inhabit the country that has an officially estimated population of 4.6 million
people (2002) and—keeping in mind emigration—a realistically estimated population of about four million. In the
context of potential conflicts, not only the numerical strength of the ethnic groups is relevant, but also the compact-
ness of their settlement areas and the fact that they, in many cases, speak their own languages. The main ethnic
groups are Georgians (70%), Armenians (8%), Azeri (6%), Russians (4%), Ossetians (3%), and Abkhaz (2%).
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1. Introduction1
The events of November 2003, taking place against the backdrop of extensive election
fraud and mass demonstrations in Georgia, resulted in the non-violent change of government
known as the Rose Revolution. It brought a young administration under Mikheil Saakashvili into
power and gave rise to hopes for an advance in the democratic consolidation that has been
stalled since 2001, thus unfolding a political dynamic of unexpected chances and challenges.2
Georgia’s transition towards a democratic regime started even before independence,
when the national opposition headed by Zviad Gamsakhurdia came to power following the par-
liamentary elections of October 1990. Further development in the process of democratization has
been marked by several interruptions. The first president of independent Georgia, Gamsakhur-
dia, was driven from office in a violent coup d’état in January 1992. While his successor, Shev-
ardnadze, succeeded in establishing a certain degree of public order, physical security, and
stability in the diverse Georgian society3 by taking action against competing violent non-state
actors, his administration failed to halt a progressive political and cultural fragmentation of the
country. Although, with the adoption of the 1995 Constitution, the formal requisites of demo-
cratic statehood were introduced under his presidency, he manipulated and transgressed these
24 The term ‘consolidation’ refers to the process of a democratic regime to become stabilized and deeply rooted. A
democracy is considered to be consolidated once the democratic rules are accepted as the only valid rules by all
important groups, once the governing political elites abstain from manipulating them, once the democracy is based
on a political culture that represents a civic culture, and once the anti-regime opposition has been weakened.
5 King David IV, born in 1073, is considered the first unifier of Georgia. He ruled the country from 1089 until his
death in 1125.
6 Cited in International Crisis Group, Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia, Europe Report No 159, Tbilisi/Brus-
sels (ICG), 26 November 2004, p. 7.
7 In regard to the two secession conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia see section 2.1c, pages 6 ff.
norms, and his rule came to be based on the accommodation of fluid clientelistic networks. Cor-
ruption and economic stagnation have undermined political, economic and legal reforms that are
essential steps for a democratic consolidation.4 Facing a decline in its authority due to internal
splits and the emergence of an opposition, the Shevardnadze administration was compelled to
adopt authoritarian measures in order to remain in power. The deterioration of performance in
nearly all policy areas caused not only a deepening of internal splits within the ruling party, but
also an alienation of the international donor community, which eventually suspended financial
support in 2003.
Right after taking office, the Saakashvili administration declared the fight against corrup-
tion and the restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity top priorities of the new government.
But Saakashvili’s statement following his highly symbolic inauguration oath at the grave of King
David IV5 in January 2004 already hinted at the dominance of the latter goal: “Georgia’s territo-
rial integrity is the goal of my life.”6 To deliver on this promise to reintegrate the two breakaway
regions of South Ossetia in the north and Abkhazia in the northwest before the presidential elec-
tions scheduled for 2009 is key for the credibility of the Georgian president.7 This has put a lot
of time pressure on the administration. Negligent steps in the matter have resulted in a perceived
escalation of the security dilemmas. A large-scale anti-smuggling campaign in South Ossetia
escalated tensions to the verge of war in July and August 2004. Furthermore, against the back-
ground of Saakashvili’s mentioned promise, Tshkinvali (South Ossetia) and Sukhumi (Abkha-
zia) are apprehensive of Tbilisi’s rapid armament (see section 2.1e, below), which—in connec-
tion with harsh tones by members of the Georgian government—is interpreted as improving
premises for a military option in conflict ‘resolution.’ This, again, causes the de facto states to
38 In an address to the UN General Assembly on September 22, Saakashvili said that “the painful, but factual truth is
that these regions [Abkhazia and South Ossetia; P.J.] are being annexed by our neighbor to the north—the Russian
Federation […].” United Nations Association of Georgia, Georgia: Saakashvili unveils ‘fresh’ roadmap in UN
speech, 22 September 2006, at: www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EKOI-6TY49H?OpenDocument
(accessed 10/2006).
9 Russia has vastly distributed Russian passports in Georgia’s two breakaway regions; e.g., South Ossetia’s de facto
foreign minister claims that close to 90 per cent of all Ossetians in South Ossetia have become Russian citizens,
cited in International Crisis Group, Georgia, 2004, p. 7; see above (footnote 6).
10 Kalevi Holsti used the term of ‘frozen conflicts’ in order to describe the result of a philosophical dilemma: “[...]
you cannot force communities to live together—particularly communities that believe their physical survival is at
stake—but you cannot separate them either. The conflict becomes frozen rather than settled. This is not conflict
resolution; it is conflict perpetuation.” Kalevi Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War. Cambridge (Cambridge
University Press), 1996, p. 196.
increase their military-political cooperation. With growing mistrust and a stealthy ‘annexation’8
via a growing economic dependency on Russia and a ‘Russification’9 policy of vastly distribut-
ing Russian passports among South Ossetians and Abkhazians, the realization of Tbilisi’s ‘top
priority’ has become increasingly unobtainable.
This report aims at analyzing the chances and challenges for Georgia’s further develop-
ment after the Rose Revolution in the face of diversity, conflict, and state failure. Georgia derives
its legitimacy as a state from a short period of independence during the three years between the
collapse of tsarist Russia in 1918 and its annexation by the Soviet Union in 1921. Contested
understandings of sovereign space and rival myths of a homeland called the Georgian state as it
existed after the dissolution of the Soviet Union into question, constituting part of its failure.
Based on (perceived) diversity, communities in Georgia’s inter-ethnic conflicts have, in the early
1990s, violently sought to redefine their relations with neighboring ‘others’ in localities charac-
terized by a mosaic of interwoven communities. In the next section the paper analyzes the three
core functions of the state—security, legitimacy/rule of law, and welfare—with a focus on their
relevance for democratic consolidation in Georgia in order to reveal what else (besides the seces-
sion conflicts) the state failure consists of and to show that the secession conflicts might not be
Georgia’s only problem. Due to their ‘frozen’10 nature, it will be argued in the conclusion that—
in addition to arduous confidence-building—strengthening the Georgian (failing) state by insti-
tution- and capacity-building and promoting good governance is a more reasonable (long-term)
strategy, especially with regard to the breakaway regions, than trying to precipitously and impru-
411 While South Ossetia strives for a federation with North Ossetia as part of Russia, Abkhazia only seeks ‘associated
relations’ with Moscow.
12 This section represents revised and updated extracts of a chapter in Pamela Jawad, Democratic Consolidation in
Georgia after the ‘Rose Revolution’? PRIF Reports No. 73, Frankfurt (PRIF), 2005.
13 The term ‘state function’ is used here as a synonym for ‘state dimension’ in order to stress the view that these
‘dimensions’ can be fulfilled to a different degree by the state authorities. Both terms are found in the literature, as is
the term ‘state tasks.’ With regard to ‘state function’ see, i.a., Ulrich Schneckener, States at Risk—Fragile Staatlich-
keit als Sicherheits- und Entwicklungsproblem, Berlin (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik), 2004; for ‘state dimen-
sion’ see, i.a., Francis Fukuyama, State-building: the new agenda, Ithaca, NY (Cornell University Press), 2004;
regarding ‘state tasks’ see, i.a., Dieter Grimm (ed.), Staatsaufgaben, Frankfurt am Main (Suhrkamp), 1996.
14 See, i.a., Grimm 1996 above (footnote 13); Jennifer Milliken/Keith Krause, State Failure, State Collapse and State
Reconstruction: Concepts, Lessons and Strategies, in: Jennifer Milliken (ed.), State Failure, Collapse and Recon-
struction, Oxford et al. (Blackwell), 2003.
15 See Thomas Risse, Governance in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit—‘Failed states’ werden zum zentralen Prob-
lem der Weltpolitik, in: Internationale Politik, 60, no. 9, 2005, pp. 6–22, here: 6.
dently ‘unfreeze’ them (in the short term). To constructively ‘unfreeze’ the two conflicts in the
near future is highly unrealistic. And a more democratic and more prosperous Georgian state
might prove to be more attractive to the breakaway regions than the closer integration with the
Russian Federation for which they currently strive.11
2. Assessment of Core Functions of the State in Georgia12
Weak, failing or collapsed states are to be found in all regions of the world. Their gov-
ernments are not able to completely fulfill the core state functions. Besides security—the mini-
mum requirement for the ‘leviathan’—legitimacy, the rule of law, and welfare are considered to
be dimensions of a state13 approximating the ideal of a democratic welfare state accordant to a
wider concept of ‘stateness.’14 Deficits in these (interdependent) dimensions—most often due to
the lack of political and administrative capacities—can be observed in almost two thirds of
today’s world of nation-states.15 In large areas of the earth, state fragility rather represents the
“norm” instead of a “deviation” from the normative model of the OECD state.
This section will show that Georgia has displayed the symptoms of a failing state. The
pathology refers not only to the two ‘frozen’ secession conflicts, but also to other security-
related aspects like high crime rates and power abuse by the authorities, to deficits in civil liber-
ties and political rights, to a lack of the rule of law and unstable political institutions as well as to
516 See, e.g., Juan Jose Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, Baltimore, MD (Johns Hopkins University Press), 1996;
Wolfgang Merkel et al., Defekte Demokratie—Band 1: Theorie, Opladen (Leske + Budrich), 2003; Peter J.
Schraeder, The State of the Art in International Democracy Promotion: Results of a Joint European-North American
Research Network, in: Democratization 10, no. 2 (2003), pp. 21–44, here: 23; Dirk Berg-Schlosser (ed.), Democra-
tization—the State of the Art, Wiesbaden (VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften), 2004; Hans Peter Schmitz, Domes-
tic and Transnational Perspectives on Democratization, in: International Studies Review 6, no. 3 (2004), pp. 403–26.
a low level of socioeconomic development, i.e., a rudimentary fulfillment of the welfare func-
tion. This pathology of state fragility in Georgia also affects the process of democratic consoli-
dation.16 Table 1 sketches the three core state functions of security, legitimacy/rule of law and
welfare, as well as indicators put forward by literature as a way of assessing them. Their assess-
ment will be carried out with a strong focus on their relevance for democratic consolidation in
Georgia.
Table 1: The Three Core State Functions Of Security,
Legitimacy/Rule Of Law And Welfare
State Function Indicators
Security (1a) high/low degree of control over the state’s entire territory;
(1b) high/low degree of control over the external borders;
(1c) absence/existence of ongoing or recurring violent conflicts;
(1d) low/high number and relevance of violent non-state actors;
(1e) good/bad state of the national security forces;
(1f) low/high level and trend of crime rates;
(1g) low/high degree of threat executed by state authorities
Legitimacy / Rule of Law (2a) low/high extent of corruption and clientelism (legal legitimacy);
(2b) low/high extent of election fraud (legal legitimacy);
(2c) high/low support for the regime (political legitimacy);
(2d) grant/restriction of civil liberties;
(2e) grant/restriction of political rights;
(2f) high/low degree of political inclusion of certain groups;
(2g) high/low degree of independence of the judiciary;
(2h) state of public administration (efficient/inefficient)
Welfare (3a) wide/small distribution of social power resources
(3b) absence/existence of prolonged economic and/or monetary crises
(3c) high/low level of tax and toll revenues
(3d) reasonable/inadequate level and distribution of state expenditures
(3e) low/high level of external debts
(3f) equality/inequality in income or consumption
(3g) low/high rate of unemployment/labor-force participation rate
(3h) high/low state of human development
(3i) good/bad state of infrastructure, education system and health care
Source: indicators are largely based on Ulrich Schneckener (ed.), States at Risk, Berlin (SWP), 2004.
617 See Linz and Stepan 1996, p. 17, above (footnote 16).
18 See Kay Hailbronner, Der Staat und der Einzelne als Völkerrechtssubjekte, in: Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum (ed.),
Völkerrecht, Berlin (De Gruyter), 2004, pp. 149–243, here: 175 ff.
19 Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Tübingen, 1980, p. 29.
20 See, e.g., Julia Leininger, State-building, in: Dieter Nohlen and Rainer-Olaf Schultze, Lexikon der Politikwissen-
schaft—Theorien, Methoden, Begriffe, München (C.H. Beck), 2005, pp. 966–967.
21 See, e.g., Amitai Etzioni, A Self-restrained Approach to Nation-building by Foreign Powers, in: International
Affairs 80, no. 1 (2004), pp. 1–17; Jochen Hippler (ed.): Nation-Building—Ein Schlüsselkonzept für friedliche
Konfliktbearbeitung? Bonn (Diez), 2004.
22 See Ulrich Schneckener (ed.), States at Risk. Fragile Staaten als Sicherheits- und Entwicklungsproblem, Berlin
(Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik), 2004, pp. 20 ff. Nevertheless, that societal development can take place without
the frame of a state is not refuted here.
2.1 Security Function of the Georgian State
A precondition for a functioning democracy is an internally and externally sovereign ter-
ritorial state, because without its existence, a state cannot be democratized.17 Therefore, in order
to democratize a country successfully, at least a minimum of ‘stateness’ is required. According
to classical (German) constitutional law tracing back to Georg Jellinek (1895), a state ought to
consist of three elements: a people, a territory, and a government executing the monopoly of
power18 or, as Max Weber put it, the “monopoly of legitimate physical coercion.”19 A nation
state represents the political organization of a (cultural) nation within a state.
The three key components of statehood imply that the problem of ‘stateness’ or state-
building is closely related to, but not identical with, that of nation-building. The elements of a
state are only complete when a common identity evolves among the inhabitants of a certain terri-
tory, thereby constituting a people. While state-building aims at the sustainable strengthening of
state structures, institutions, and governance capacities, concentrating on the state level and
political players,20 nation-building contains societal development as a whole, especially concern-
ing the evolvement of a national identity.21 Both processes complement one another: A political
community on the one hand is endangered if parts of society do not identify with it and thereafter
claim their own state or consider the distribution of power and resources to be unfair. On the
other hand, without the frame of a state one can hardly imagine societal development taking
place.22
723 See Grimm (ed.), 1996, above (footnote 13); Jennifer Milliken and Keith Krause, State Failure, State Collapse and
State Reconstruction: Concepts, Lessons and Strategies, in: Jennifer Milliken (ed.), State Failure, Collapse and
Reconstruction, Oxford et al. (Blackwell), 2003; Francis Fukuyama, State building, Ithaca, NY (Cornell University
Press), 2004; Martina Huber, State-building in Georgia. Unfinished and at Risk? Den Haag (Netherlands Institute of
International Relations “Clingendael”), 2004; Schneckener 2004, see above (footnote 22); Thomas Risse, Gover-
nance in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit—“Failed States” werden zum zentralen Problem der Weltpolitik, in:
Internationale Politik, 60, no. 9 (2005), pp. 6–22.
24 These indicators for the security function of the state were developed by the “States at Risk” working group of
SWP; see Schneckener 2004, p. 13, above (footnote 22).
Contemporary literature considers the three elements to represent only minimal criteria in
defining ‘stateness.’ They are represented in the state’s security function that is treated in this
section. A wider concept, approximating the ideal of a democratic welfare state, also postulates
legitimacy, the rule of law, or welfare as further dimensions besides security.23 These other
dimensions will be analyzed in the subsequent sections.
Security is a primary function of the state. In order to guarantee the physical security of
the citizens internally and externally, the core of this function is to control the territory through
the state’s monopoly of power. Indicators for the analysis of this dimension are: (1a) the degree
of control over the state’s entire territory; (1b) the degree of control over the external borders;
(1c) the existence of ongoing or recurring violent conflicts; (1d) the number and political rele-
vance of violent non-state actors; (1e) the state of the national security forces; (1f) the level and
trend of crime rates; (1g) the degree of threat executed by state institutions towards its citizens
(e.g., torture, deportations etc.).24
The following paragraphs will show how difficult the conditions for democratic con-
solidation have been and still are with regard to the unfinished processes of state- and nation-
building in Georgia. Although the Saakashvili administration has regained control over the
southwestern republic of Ajara and, thereby, over the border to Turkey, the existence of the two
secession conflicts in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia with corresponding
armed non-state actors still represent profitable pockets of illegal trade and—with the danger of
the confrontations re-igniting—not only a major obstacle but also a threat to ‘stateness.’
825 For the general role of Soviet nationality policy in the recurrence of national movements in the late 1980s or its
effect on the relationships between different communities see particularly Rexane Dehdashti, Internationale Organi-
sationen als Vermittler in innerstaatlichen Konflikten. Die OSZE und der Berg Karabach-Konflikt, Frankfurt am
Main (Campus), 2000, pp. 26–36.
26 See Darrell Slider, Democratization in Georgia, in: Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (eds.), Democratization and
Authoritarianism in Postcommunist Societies, Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1997, p. 169.
27 See International Crisis Group, Georgia’s Armenian and Azeri Minorities, Europe Report No. 178, Tbilisi/Brus-
sels (ICG), 22 November 2006, p. i.
Territorial Integrity (1a)
The collapse of the Soviet Union triggered a geopolitical rearrangement of the Caucasus
region. While the Northern Caucasus is composed of different regions and autonomous republics
that are part of the Russian Federation, the Southern Caucasus comprises the three republics of
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, each of which declared independence in 1991. But even after
15 years, Georgia has not succeeded in expanding the sovereignty of its central government over
the entire territory. From the very start, the country has been confronted with severe internal con-
flicts (see below). Under Soviet rule, more autonomous units were built up in Georgia than in
any other Soviet republic other than Russia.25 Thus, no other state in the post-Soviet area has as
many difficulties in securing or restoring territorial integrity or in controlling its territory as
Georgia.26 Today, around 15 per cent of Georgia’s territory is not under Tbilisi’s control.
Apart from the two breakaway regions of Abkhazia in the northwest and South Ossetia in
the north, there are parts of the country which do not strive for secession but which nevertheless
are or have been out of Tbilisi’s control. At issue here are isolated parts of the country such as
the northern valleys of Svaneti and Pankisi, the inhabitants of which are of Chechen descent, or
regions in the south predominantly inhabited by Armenian and Azeri minorities that reject the
notion of being part of Georgia, e.g., Samtskhe-Javakheti or Kvemo-Kartli. Although tensions
are evident in these regions, which have seen demonstrations, alleged police brutality and kill-
ings, also during the past two years, there is no risk of these situations becoming threats to the
state’s territorial integrity to the degree of South Ossetia or Akhazia. However, Tbilisi needs to
pay more attention to minority rights in these regions, if it is to avoid further conflict.27
Until May 2004 the southwestern republic of Ajara was governed under the authoritarian
rule of Aslan Abashidze. Abashidze, who followed his personal economic and power interests by
928 See Martina Bielawski and Uwe Halbach, Der georgische Knoten—Die Südossetien-Krise im Kontext georgisch-
russischer Beziehungen, Berlin (SWP), 2004, p. 3; Heidelberg Institute on International Conflict Research, Conflict
Barometer 2004, Heidelberg (HIIK), 2004, p. 11; International Crisis Group, Saakashvili’s Ajara Success: Repeat-
able Elsewhere in Georgia? Tbilisi/Brussels (ICG), 18 August 2004, p. 8.
taking advantage of the weak central state and refusing to pay taxes and duties, had maintained
strong ties to Russia. Tensions in Ajara ran high after Saakashvili was denied entry to Ajara on
15 March 2004. As a reaction, the Georgian government imposed an economic blockade against
Ajara, put its forces on alert, and issued an ultimatum for Abashidze to disarm his paramilitary
forces and submit to Tbilisi’s rule. While many people in Ajara switched loyalty and demon-
strated against Abashidze, the latter imposed a state of emergency and, on 2 May, blew up three
main bridges linking Ajara to central Georgia.28 However, against the backdrop of the temporary
rapprochement between Tbilisi and Moscow after the Rose Revolution, Russia’s mediation
resulted in the non-violent resolution of the crisis in Ajara and in Abashidze’s and his clan’s
emigration to Moscow. Ajara’s re-integration into the Georgian central state was considered a
successful result of Saakashvili’s attempts to restore the territorial integrity of the country. But
by trying to repeat this success in the breakaway regions, he almost triggered an escalation to
war in South Ossetia. In contrast to Abkhazia or South Ossetia, the conflict with Ajara did not
have an ethnic dimension because, although predominantly Muslim, the Ajarans consider
themselves to be ethnic Georgians and did not strive for independence.
Control of External Borders (1b)
Closely related to the two secession conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the central
government lacks adequate control of Georgia’s external borders. So-called ‘no-go areas’ in the
Pankisi gorge, the Kodori valley, or the Gali district are considered to be safe havens for interna-
tional terrorists and Chechen rebels, and conditions there have stimulated Russia to launch mili-
tary operations repeatedly on Georgian territory, thereby undermining the latter’s sovereignty.
Russia’s activities were justified by the fight against terrorism, as has been intensified US-
Georgian security co-operation.
Due to the fact that Tbilisi’s customs organization has no control over the areas next to
the borders with Russia and (until the re-integration of Ajara) with Turkey—the two countries
10
29 See International Crisis Group, Georgia, 2004, p. 3, above (footnote 6).
30 For OSCE long-term missions see Pamela Jawad, Krisenprävention—Zehn Jahre Langzeitmissionen der Organisa-
tion für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (OSZE) 1992 bis 2001, Magisterarbeit, University of Heidelberg,
2003.
31 For a more detailed analysis of the conflict with Abkhazia and the role of Russia see Oksana Antonenko, Frozen
Uncertainty: Russia and the Conflict over Abkhazia, in: Bruno Coppieters and Robert Legvold (eds.), Statehood and
Security: Georgia after the Rose Revolution, Cambridge/London (MIT Press), 2005, pp. 205–69.
that dominate Georgia’s foreign trade—the weak ‘stateness’ also has severe economic consequences.
Violent Conflicts (1c)
Against the backdrop of the Glasnost policy of the last Soviet President Mikhail Gorba-
chev (1985–1991), Abkhazian and Ossetian nationalists began striving for more autonomy in the
late 1980s. These tensions were increased following independence by the Georgian-nationalist
orientation of Gamsakhurdia’s rule. Heavy fighting broke out in the autonomous region of South
Ossetia even before the country’s declaration of independence. Tbilisi had de facto lost control
over this area in Northern Georgia by the end of 1990. On 20 September 1990, South Ossetia
declared its independence, but strove for a federation with North Ossetia as part of Russia after
the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In a referendum held in January 1992, a large majority voted
in favor of integration into the Russian Federation. The South Ossetian Supreme Council, too,
pledged for this option on 19 November.29 The fighting that continued until June 1992 resulted in
around one thousand casualties and displaced around 120,000 people. On 14 July 1992, joint
Russian-Georgian-Ossetian peacekeeping forces were established. In order to promote negotia-
tions between the conflicting parties, a long-term mission of the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was established in November 1992.30
After the northwestern autonomous republic of Abkhazia declared independence in July
1992, the strife for secession there also heavily escalated. Between 1917 and 1931, Abkhazia had
represented a Soviet republic of its own, before it was integrated into the Georgian Soviet
Socialist republic. The secessionist war, which continued until the ceasefire agreement of 14
May 1994, displaced around 250,000 people, most of them ethnic Georgians. The ceasefire has
since then been monitored by around 1,500 peacekeeping troops from the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) and the United Nations Observer Mission to Georgia (UNOMIG).31
11
32 For a more detailed analysis of the two secession conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia see Pamela Jawad,
Europe’s New Neighborhood on the Verge of War: What Role for the EU in Georgia? PRIF Reports No. 74,
Frankfurt (PRIF), 2006, pp. 5–12.
33 For an analysis of the period between 1989 and 1993 in Georgia see Christoph Zürcher, Georgia’s Time of
Troubles, 1989–1993, in: Coppieters and Legvold (eds.) 2005, pp. 83–115, see above (footnote 31).
34 See Norwegian Refugee Council, Profile of Internal Displacement: Georgia. Compilation of the Information avail-
able in the Global IDP Database (as of 18 March, 2004), 18 March 2004, p. 31.
These two secession conflicts occurred against the background of intense political insta-
bility.32 Prior to the declaration of independence, the change of power from Soviet rule had
already been formally introduced by the parliamentary elections of 28 October 1990. A hetero-
geneous party alliance forged around the national dissident Gamsakhurdia, who had excelled at
human rights activities having belonged to the founders of the Tbilisi wing of the Helsinki Group
that called for the implementation of the CSCE principles in the 1970s, and who had been
arrested for anti-Soviet activities several times, achieved an overwhelming victory. Such a vic-
tory has to be put into perspective, however, because many of the political parties boycotted the
elections. Thus, Gamsakhurdia could not consolidate his position as President, and his followers
subsequently split into rivalling factions. He was overthrown in January 1992 in a civil-war-like
coup by armed forces that took advantage of the growing dissatisfaction among the population at
the regime’s corruption, human rights violations, and abuse of power. Shevardnadze, former
Secretary General of the Georgian Communist Party and former Foreign Minister of the Soviet
Union, returned to Georgia in March 1992 and became chairman of the hastily set-up Interim
Council. Gamsakhurdia’s followers tried to regain power by attacking military and police forces
in Western Georgia in 1992 and 1993. This struggle resulted in their final military defeat in
October 1993 and Gamsakhurdia’s alleged suicide in January 1994.33
Shevardnadze tried to counteract the imminent state collapse by deploying troops in the
separatist regions. In this context, around 250,000 Georgians from Abkhazia and 10,000 Geor-
gians from South Ossetia became refugees, and 80,000 Ossetians took refuge in the Russian
north.34 Initially, Shevardnadze continued Gamsakhurdia’s strategy of limiting Russian influence
in the country as much as possible. But, faced with rising violence, he accepted Russia’s peace-
keeping role in Abkhazia in October 1993. Georgia also became a member of the CIS. In return,
12
35 See Slider 1997, p. 157, above (footnote 26).
36 For a more details on this recent crisis between Georgia and Russia see Jawad 2006, above (footnote 32).
37 See ICG, Ajara Success, 2004, above (footnote 28).
38 See ICG, Ajara Success, 2004, p. 2, above (footnote 28).
Russia promised to secure Georgia’s territorial integrity and to defend its borders.35 Since then,
besides having its own interests in the region, Russia has maintained military bases in Georgia,
deployed peacekeepers in Abkhazia, and acted as a mediator in South Ossetia. The existence of
the two remaining Russian military bases in Akhalkalaki (Javakheti) and Batumi (Ajara) has
created tensions between the two countries. Russia has announced the withdrawal of her troops
by 2008, but, with problems in the North Caucasus deepening, sensitivities in the region remain
great nevertheless. This became evident once more in the fall of 2006 when tensions between the
two neighbors escalated to the verge of military confrontation.36 The recent crisis was triggered
by the publicly played out arrest of four Russian military officers for charges of espionage in
Georgia. Russia responded harshly by imposing the most severe boycott measures since the 1948
Berlin Blockade against Tbilisi.
After the high intensity of violence in the early 1990s, the two secession conflicts in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia are now considered to be ‘frozen.’ The development of the intensity
of independent Georgia’s internal conflicts is shown in graph 1.
Despite the ‘frozen’ status of the secessionist conflicts, the country teetered on the verge
of intrastate war in July and August 2004 when the new Georgian government tried to repeat its
successful resolution of the Ajara crisis of May 2004 in South Ossetia. Saakashvili’s administra-
tion ignored the fact that the secession conflicts fundamentally differ from the conditions in
Ajara. Not only do the secession conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have an ethnic compo-
nent in their quest for self-determination, Russia also pursues its perceived security interests
there on a much higher scale.37 In order to re-integrate South Ossetia into the central state, Tbilisi
applied a double-track strategy. On the one hand, a large-scale, anti-smuggling campaign was
supposed to deprive the South Ossetian authorities under the rule of de facto President Eduard
Kokoity of their economic basis. On the other, massive humanitarian aid aimed at gaining the
South Ossetians’ support.38 However, the outcome was the opposite: the central government’s 
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Graph 1: Georgia's Internal Conflicts Since Independence, 1991 to 2006
Source: author’s assessment39
approach, which included the deployment of 400 troops near the border with South Ossetia,
resulted in a severe escalation of the tensions. According to the conflict parties, 17 Georgians
and five Ossetians were killed during repeated violent incidents between the opposing armed
forces in July and August 2004.40 The mutual confidence that could have been built up in the
conflict region since 1992 was now undermined once more. Moreover, Georgian-Russian rela-
tions worsened anew. In June and July 2004, Tbilisi accused Moscow of supplying weapons to
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South Ossetia and confiscated trucks of Russian security forces. This resulted in a ‘war of
words’ between the neighboring states. There were also reports of around 1,000 Russian merce-
naries entering the conflict region in mid-June 2004.41 Moscow’s sensitivities were also affected
by Abkhazia’s ‘presidential elections’ of October 2004, revealing internal frictions between
Russia-backed Prime Minister Raul Khajimba and opposition candidate Sergei Bagapsh, who
ultimately won the election. There were even reports of heavy Russian artillery relocating from
the Georgian-Abkhazian border to Sokhumi.
Privatization of Violence (1d) and National Security Structures (1e)
As the re-ignition of the ‘frozen conflict’ with South Ossetia demonstrates, violent non-
state actors are still a relevant factor in Georgia’s development. This is true not only for seces-
sionist forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but also for Georgian partisan formations, e.g., the
‘Forest Brothers,’ the ‘White Legion,’ and the ‘Hunters,’ who fought and still fight local violent
actors in Abkhazia and who have maintained questionable relations with the official security
forces of the central government.42 Militia dominated the criminalized state structures in the
early years of Georgia’s independence between 1991 and 1994, which were characterized by an
anarchy of national security structures. The putsch against Gamsakhurdia in January 1992
resulted in a dissolution of public law and order. In contrast to Gamsakhurdia, his successor,
Shevardnadze, eventually consolidated his power by founding his political party, the Citizens
Union of Georgia (CUG), in 1993. This proved to be a success, although the CUG was hetero-
geneous, notwithstanding the fact that Shevardnadze’s followers all emanated from the former
communist nomenclature. The adoption of the new constitution in August 1995 marked a rela-
tively successful milestone in stabilizing the country after “three more years during which com-
peting forces within the government were played off against each other”43. Due to the opposing
positions within the constituent assembly, the help given by international organizations and
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experts represented a decisive catalyst in the process of drafting and passing the new constitu-
tion.44 Despite Shevardnadze’s failure to prevent the de facto independence of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, he succeeded in disbanding several paramilitary groups and destroying the most
important ‘Zviadist formations’45.46
The armed structures in Ajara were dissolved after the capitulation of Abashidze’s
regime in May 2004, and earlier that year, there had also been massive police operations aimed
at dissolving Georgian guerilla forces along the line of demarcation with Abkhazia. Although
these were important steps concerning state-building in Georgia, the nationalization of a physical
force remains incomplete, coupled with the fact that national security structures were considered
to have been infiltrated with informal networks and widespread corruption during the Shevard-
nadze era. Overall, the state of the national security forces has been poor, which was reflected by
a revolt of around 200 troops in 1998 and an uprising of the national guard in Mukhravani in
May 2001.
More recently, in an effort to arm the forces along NATO standards, the country has
raised its military expenditures since 2003 from the former level of 0.5 to 3 per cent of the gross
domestic product (GDP). In 2005 alone, the increase amounted to 143 per cent.47 With US sup-
port, this has been accompanied by an impressive security sector reform of a ‘slimming’ of the
armed forces, a conversion from a compulsory military service to a professional army, and the
dissolution of old Soviet structures like the military apparatus of the Ministry of the Interior. The
intensified US-Georgian security co-operation took shape in the deployment of around 200 US
military advisors and trainers in the context of the Georgian Train and Equip Program (GTEP)
which started in fall 2001 and continued until April 2004. GTEP has been succeeded by the Sus-
tainment and Stability Operations Program (SSOP), which aimed at increasing the capability of
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the Georgian military to support Operation Iraqi Freedom stability missions. By 1 March 2005,
Georgia had already deployed the first full infantry battalion in support of US-led operations in
Iraq. Not only has the US engagement in the region alienated Russia as the ‘traditional domestic
great power,’ but Georgia’s armament efforts have also increased apprehension among the
breakaway regions, resulting in a perceived escalation of the security dilemmas. Tshkinvali
(South Ossetia) and Sukhumi (Abkhazia) feel threatened by Tbilisi’s rapid armament, and it—in
connection with harsh tones by members of Saakashvili’s administration—is interpreted as
improving premises for a military option of conflict ‘resolution.’
Crime (1f)
The regions where the two secession conflicts are taking place have become profitable
pockets of illegal trade, with severe economic consequences for the state budget. Georgia lost
almost 200 million US dollars in 2003 from non-declared oil products alone, and around 30
million US dollars due to tobacco smuggling.48 Besides smuggling, human and drug trafficking
have flourished in the breakaway regions, the latter taking the so-called new silk road from
Afghanistan. But the country as a whole is characterized by social distrust and a disposition to
violence. In Tbilisi alone, 23.6 per cent of citizens were victims of crime in 1999; 16.6 per cent
of bribery.49 These figures underpin the frustration among Georgians which has been increasing
since the end of the 1990s. A major source of the frustration is poverty and the pervasive corrup-
tion affecting all areas of life, causing permanent uncertainty (see section 2a below).50
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Abuse of State Power (1g)
The 1995 Constitution provides for the protection of all fundamental human rights and
freedoms that are mentioned in the European Convention on Human Rights.51 In the run-up to
the accession to the Council of Europe (CoE) in 1999, Georgia passed several reforms in order to
align with European standards, but these reforms were subsequently diluted or revoked.52 Thus,
on the human and civil rights level, the trend was negative by the end of the 1990s. Reports by
international observers repeatedly spoke of assaults by the police, death threats by state officials
against journalists, as well as the use of electric shocks on convicts. This situation has been
worsened by the failure to apply the rule of law. Against the backdrop of more active attempts to
fight organized crime under the new government after the Rose Revolution, reports of torture in
preliminary detention facilities and of violations of due process in politically sensitive cases
even increased.53
2.2 Legitimacy and Rule of Law Function of the Georgian State
There is no institutional blueprint for creating the ideal conditions needed for successful
democratization independent of time and space in any society. Nevertheless, the social contract
idea is based on representation and accountability. Therefore, government institutions are
expected to be representative, effective, respected, and supported by the public, who demand the
regime to be legitimate, in other words, that its institutions act within the scope of the constitu-
tion and the laws. As a rule, a regime is said to be more stable the greater and more deeply-
rooted its legitimacy is because legitimacy indicates loyalty by the citizens to the state. Constitu-
tional literature presents four legitimating and functional imperatives: legitimacy; institutional
inclusion providing relevant political groups with adequate access to political decision-making;
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efficiency; and effectiveness.54 Only when these four preconditions exist to a sufficient degree
(depending on the individual case), can the democratic institutional order generate stable accep-
tance among its citizens and political elites.55 The following indicators are used to assess institu-
tional stability or the state function of legitimacy and the rule of law respectively: (2a) the extent
of corruption and clientelism (legal legitimacy); (2b) the extent of election fraud (legal legiti-
macy); (2c) the support for the regime (political legitimacy); (2d) the granting of civil liberties;
(2e) the granting of political rights; (2f) the degree of political inclusion of certain groups (e.g.,
ethnic minorities); (2g) the degree of independence of the judiciary; (2h) the state of the public
administration.
The following paragraphs will show that endemic corruption is among Georgia’s most
deep-seated structural problems, undermining the legitimacy of political institutions and creating
permanent uncertainty among the citizens. The Saakashvili administration declared the fight
against corruption to be one of its top priorities, and although pertinent corruption ratings
reached a negative peak in 2004,56 since then the campaign has made some progress in reducing
corruption incentives. Nevertheless, the new government’s hard-line approach undermines civil
liberties and the independence of the judiciary, thereby increasing the use of authoritarian
measures. Demonstrating strength by applying authoritarian measures does not, however, imply
the stability of political institutions. On the contrary. After the Rose Revolution, institutions are
still unstable and Saakashvili has so far failed to consolidate his charismatic rule by creating a
stable power base.
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Legitimacy: Extent of Corruption and Clientelism (2a), Extent of Election Fraud (2b), and
Support for the Regime (2c)
Legitimacy can be measured by the extent the regime complies with the law (legal legiti-
macy) and by the extent the population supports the regime (political legitimacy).
Throughout her 15 years of independence, Georgia has experienced a deepening crisis of
governance. The state is failing, and power structures have had their informal nature cloaked by
a constitutional ‘democracy façade.’ Widespread corruption and clientelism have eroded the
people’s trust in the lawfulness of the political rulers. Laws have been passed, but only imple-
mented if their essence coincides with the interests of their mostly corrupt implementers.57 A
general lawlessness, pervasive organization of crime, erratic law enforcement, and contested
sovereignty can be observed in Georgia, which clearly testify against the legal legitimacy of the
Shevardnadze regime. Notwithstanding Shevardnadze’s positive reputation in ‘Western’ states,
which could be ascribed to his role in the German reunification process as well as the pro-
‘Western’ orientation of his foreign policy,58 Georgia became one of the most corrupt countries
in the world during his presidency. Indeed, a large anti-corruption campaign was launched in
2000, but it only produced rhetorical publicity without having any actual impact. Uncovered
incidences of corruption received very little effective punishment.59 Nevertheless, Transparency
International argues that the mobilization of civil society and the creation of coalitions of civil
society organizations can press governments into addressing corruption as a matter of priority.
Georgia’s Rose Revolution is, to this extent, a striking example, since it resulted in the formation
of a new government with a strong anti-corruption program, committed to transforming a previ-
ously corrupt system (see below).60
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Shevardnadze’s rule was based on flexible alliances and the manipulation of instable
patron-client networks.61 These strategies proved to be useful in order to overcome chaos and
violence, but were not conducive to the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law. In the
absence of an effective parliamentary opposition, a presidential system with an unusually strong
executive evolved. The dominance of informal decision-making circumvented procedural legiti-
macy. The horizontal separation of powers was guaranteed in principle, but, in fact, the govern-
ment, which focused on the president, was barely accountable to parliament. In some cases, this
led to “an institutionalized attitude of ‘it’s not my responsibility’.”62
Despite adequate formal regulations concerning the principles of democratic elections,
none of the polls conducted during Shevardnadze’s presidency were in compliance with interna-
tional standards. On the contrary, throughout the late 1990s, election manipulations became even
worse, causing a rapid loss of legitimacy. Such intensifying election fraud can be explained by a
strengthening of the opposition in parallel to Shevardnadze’s abating popularity. In 1999, the
division of the CUG into the so-called reformist wing and presidential loyalists, as well as the
success of a heterogeneous alliance of oppositional parties in gaining a considerable amount of
votes for the first time, marked, on the one hand, an advance in the evolving Georgian political
party system, but, on the other, a decline in Shevardnadze’s authority. Furthermore, with grow-
ing transparency of the election process due to improved laws and more effective monitoring, the
election fraud became more evident.63 This is especially true for the parliamentary elections in
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November 2003 which eventually resulted in massive popular protests that brought the so-called
‘young reformers’ around Saakashvili64, Zurab Zhvania,65 and Nino Burjanadze into power.
With regard to the extraordinary presidential elections of January 2004, international
observers reported “notable progress over previous elections.”66 However, there were still some
shortcomings, especially concerning the election commission, which was still dominated by the
old authorities, and voter lists, which were still imprecise (see below, Table 2). The Saakashvili
administration has so far failed to work on the development of a democratic system of checks
and balances. On the contrary, constitutional changes in February 2004 further strengthened
presidential powers and weakened parliament, which was already lacking credible opposition
forces.
As far as political legitimacy during the Shevardnadze era is concerned, a clear majority
of the population believed that the existing state institutions were not functioning properly. The
Ministry of Internal Affairs, the police, and parliament were perceived as the worst performing
agencies.67 According to data collected by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP),
the citizens’ trust in government institutions decreased in the late 1990s. While 42 per cent had a
high to medium level of trust in government institutions in 1996, this figure had dropped to 25
per cent by 1998.68 Although the new government under Saakashvili has contributed to “the re-
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emergence of a rudimentary trust in official institutions […], more efforts are needed to over-
come the heritage of a deeply entrenched clientelistic culture”69 in order to contribute to a
stabilization of the political system.
Immediately after gaining power, the Saakashvili administration launched a major anti-
corruption campaign and has so far made “tremendous efforts”70 to dismantle systemic corrup-
tion. Relevant legal and institutional changes in this regard include among others: a judicial
reform package of December 2004 and February 2005, intended to augment the independence of
the courts (see section 2g below) and strengthen the government’s ability to prosecute corrupt
judges by raising the salaries of judges and elaborating the government’s disciplinary response to
violations by judges; the adoption of a revised tax code in December 2004, streamlining the
existing system and increasing the capacity and incentives for tax payment;71 and an anti-corrup-
tion working group, established by a presidential decree in January 2005 with the goal of devel-
oping an anti-corruption strategy. Although these efforts have the potential to actually reduce
incentives for corruption, and some progress has already been made (see below, Table 2), the
new government’s hard-line approach endangers civil liberties. Thus, the current hard-line
approach under Saakashvili may be reason for both optimism and concern. While Georgia is still
considered to be one of the most corrupt countries in the world, ranking 130 out of 158 accord-
ing to the Global Corruption Report 2006,72 within one year, it has improved by three ranks on
the perceived corruption index.73 But there have been reports of torture and violations of due
process in politically sensitive cases (see below). All in all, the government’s anti-corruption
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targets have been overshadowed by the campaign to reintegrate South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
thereby restoring Georgia’s territorial integrity.
Granting of Civil Liberties (2d), Political Rights (2e) and Political Inclusion (2f)
The responsibility of the state in terms of institutional inclusion involves providing
respective structures for participation, representation, and accountability, i.e., civil liberties and
political rights, which ensure adequate access for politically relevant groups to political decision-
making. This is a fundamental prerequisite for democratic consolidation, especially in pluralistic
and diverse societies such as Georgia.
Georgia’s political system is characterized by a paradox. The constitution prescribes a
unitary state with maximum centralization of powers, while, in reality, the breakaway republics
do not participate in national political life at all, and, in most cases, the regions have little if any
connections to the center. The 1995 Constitution fails to divide responsibilities and define inter-
action between local, regional and state levels.74 Apart from this, important political forces have
been barred from parliament. While in the 1992 parliamentary elections this fact could be ex-
plained with boycotts and bans, in 1995 it resulted from a fragmentation of the evolving Geor-
gian party system, as well as from changes in the electoral system and the introduction of a five
per cent threshold. In the 1995 parliamentary elections, only three out of 53 campaigning politi-
cal parties won seats in parliament having barely gained 39 per cent of the votes—the CUG won
almost 24 per cent. Shevardnadze won 74 per cent of the votes in the presidential elections that
took place at the same time and which had a voter turnout of 69 per cent.75
Despite the founding of several new political parties in the 1990s, parties in Georgia
remain weak, unstable and focused on individuals rather than on political ideas and programs.
They are not rooted in society. Therefore, the political system lacks institutional inclusion and
representation on all societal levels. Although Georgia is a multinational state, building demo-
cratic institutions and forging civil society, it has made little progress towards integrating
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Armenian and Azeri minorities, who constitute over twelve per cent of the population.76 Minori-
ties are hardly represented at all in all spheres of public life, and the candidacy of their repre-
sentatives is often blocked. National unity has been given priority over minority protection.
Tensions are especially evident in the regions of Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo-Kartli in the
south, where Armenians and Azeris predominantly live.
As far as political rights and civil liberties are concerned, Georgia has consistently been
considered ‘partly free’ in pertinent indices.77 This does not reflect the fact that there have been
some anxious developments. In the latter years of the Shevardnadze administration, the harass-
ment of politically active NGOs and independent media outlets became part of everyday life.78
After the Rose Revolution, independent media became less critical and pluralistic and reports on
due process violations indicated that civil liberties were being endangered by the new govern-
ment’s hard-line approach against corruption.
Table 2: Ratings for Georgia’s Democratic Development 1997 to 200579
Ratings 1997 1998 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Electoral Process 5 4.5 4 4.5 5 5.25 5.25 4.75 4.75
Civil Society 4.5 4.25 3.75 4 4 4 3.5 3.5 3.5
Independent Media 4.5 4.25 3.75 3.5 3.75 4 4 4.25 4.25
Governance 4.5 5 4.5 4.75 5 5.5 5.75 n/a n/a
 - national democratic governance n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 5.5 5.5
 - local democratic governance n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 6 5.75
Judicial Framework and
Independence 5 4.75 4 4 4.25 4.5 4.5 5 4.75
Corruption n/a n/a 5 5.25 5.5 5.75 6 5.75 5.5
Source: Ghia Nodia, Nations in Transit 2005: Georgia, Freedom House, 2005, p.1.
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Independence of the Judiciary (2g)
Although the 1995 Georgian Constitution provides important safeguards for the indepen-
dence of the judiciary, courts have been even less capable of withstanding political pressure by
the executive after the Rose Revolution than before, and have hardly ever disagreed with the
prosecution’s demands. The prosecution has often violated due process in politically-sensitive
cases related to allegations of corruption.80 Government representatives have informally justified
this pressure by alleging that the judiciary was corrupt. Indeed, the payment of bribes to judges,
whose salaries remain inadequate, is reportedly common.81
Although a reform in 1998 led to an increase in professional qualification by introducing
a system of common-law courts which required judges to pass exams organized by the Council
of Justice (a consulting body whose members are appointed or elected by the president, parlia-
ment, and the Supreme Court), a rising pass rate indirectly indicates that exam standards have
declined lately.82
All in all, the level of independence of the judiciary is still not high (see above, Table 2)
and the rate of executed court decisions—the traditional problem of the Georgian judicial sys-
tem—remains low. Nevertheless, a recent development might lead to the strengthening of the
judiciary’s independence. In February 2004, an amendment to the Constitution provided for the
institution of the jury trial in Georgia. However, implementing legislation is still to be adopted.
State of Public Administration (2h)
Political institutions need to enable prompt decision-making and implementation (effi-
ciency) as well as the resolution of societal problems (effectiveness). The dominance of informal
decision-making processes, the parallel existence of decision-makers with overlapping compe-
tences, and the repeated regrouping in parliament and government in reaction to economic and
political crises in Georgia have resulted in a lack of programmatic and conceptual consistency, a
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further weakening of the political capacity to act, and increasing inefficiency.83 Although parlia-
ment has managed to promote and push through a number of democratic reforms, there have
been delays and shortcomings in the implementation of the laws passed due to the fact that par-
liament has only limited leverage over and co-ordination with the executive.84
The executive has been ineffective and qualified personnel have been hard to find since
remuneration has remained well below living standards. But after the Rose Revolution, some
efforts were made to improve the situation. Significant turnover has occurred at the higher levels
of the central bureaucracy. Staff cuts were carried out across the board.85 The effectiveness of the
executive branch has actually increased, especially in attracting public revenues. In January
2004, the salaries of about 10,000 public servants were raised and the number of ministries was
decreased.86 However, in the regions outside Tbilisi the government was forced to rely mostly on
officials who had already been in place before the Rose Revolution. Therefore, Saakashvili—in
an attempt to ensure greater control of the ‘periphery’—has often parachuted figures to lead-
ership positions on the basis of loyalty to him rather than experience or local popularity.87
2.3 Welfare Function of the Georgian State
Modernization theory suggests that there is a relationship between socioeconomic devel-
opment and the chances for democratic consolidation. Economic and social development posi-
tively correlates with the survivability of democracies88 as well as with the guarantee of political
rights and civil liberties.89 Early representatives of modernization theory argued that economic
27
90 See Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East, New York (Free Press),
1958; Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, New York (Anchor Books), 1960; Karl
W. Deutsch, Social Mobilization and Political Development, in: American Political Science Review 55 (1961), pp.
493–504.
91 See Axel Hadenius, Democracy and Development, Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1992; John F. Helli-
well, Empirical Linkages between Democracy and Economic Growth, in: British Journal of Political Science 24
(1994), pp. 225–248.
92 See Tatu Vanhanen, Democratization: A Comparative Analysis of 170 Countries, London/New York (Routledge),
2003. In this context, also see Vanhanen’s Index of Power Resources that consists of three indices: (1) occupational
diversification, (2) knowledge distribution and (3) distribution of economic power resources. These indices are
derived from six variables: (a) urban population as a percentage of total population, (b) non-agricultural population
(derived by subtracting the percentage of the agricultural population from 100 per cent), (c) number of students (uni-
versities and other institutions of higher education) per 100,000 inhabitants of the country, (d) literates as a percent-
age of the adult population, (e) family farms as a percentage of total cultivated area or of total area of holdings;
(f) degree of decentralization of non-agricultural economic resources (“Democratization and Power Resources 1850-
2000”; data for 172 countries can be downloaded at www.fsd.uta.fi/english/data/catalogue/FSD1216/ (accessed
9/2005).
93 See also Carlos Boix and Susan Stokes, Endogenous Democratization, in: World Politics 55 (2003), pp. 517–49.
In reaction to the argument that, though economic prosperity sustains and stabilizes democracies, it does not create
the conditions for its emergence, Boix and Stokes argue that prosperous democracies are indeed more likely to sur-
vive, but that in fact economic growth also causes democratization. Their most decisive explanatory variable is not
prosperity per se, but the degree of equality in the income distribution.
growth above a certain threshold stimulates social change in the shape of urbanization, increased
levels of literacy, and easier access to the media.90 Later on, these factors became less prominent,
and education was seen as an important link between economic and political development.91 In
contrast to this, it was also argued that socioeconomic development is only an intervening varia-
ble, one that correlates positively with democratization because power resources are usually dis-
tributed more diversely at a higher level of socioeconomic development than at a lower level.92
The chances of successful democratization are higher if social power resources are distributed so
diversely that no social group is able to repress another group to maintain its political hege-
mony.93 Socioeconomic development and the welfare function of the state can be measured by
the following indicators: (3a) distribution of social power resources; (3b) prolonged economic
and/or monetary crises; (3c) level of tax and duty revenues; (3d) level and distribution of state
expenditures; (3e) level of external debts; (3f) (in)equality in income or consumption; (3g) rate
of unemployment/labor-force participation rate; (3h) state of human development; (3i) state of
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infrastructure, education system and health care.94 These indicators as they occur in Georgia are
summarized in Table 3 (page 30).
In the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s dissolution and the highly violent conflicts in
Georgia in the early 1990s, the Georgian economy experienced a dramatic breakdown. As part of
the USSR, Georgia along with Estonia and Latvia had been among the richest Soviet republics as
measured by per capita consumption and real income. After regaining independence, Georgia
faced an almost complete collapse of its productive sector. For long periods of time the main
transport links and communication channels to Russia were interrupted owing to the secession
disputes. In addition, the war between the neighboring states of Armenia and Azerbaijan was
accompanied by acts of sabotage against the pipelines carrying Azeri oil to Georgia. In addition
to these circumstances, an unwillingness to push through economic reforms prevailed in Tbilisi,
although there was general agreement over their necessity.95 Lawmaking concerning tax and
duties was predominantly influenced by narrow, specific interests, resulting in extensive excep-
tional regulations for certain subgroups. Despite a general increase in the collection of taxes in
the mid-1990s, the state lacked the resources necessary for financing a growth-promoting infra-
structure. The proportion of taxes in relation to gross national product (GNP) hovered at a very
low level of around 15 per cent. A flourishing black market, money counterfeiting, and smug-
gling are commonplace in Georgia and not conducive to healthy tax revenues. The poor infra-
structure is demonstrated by frequent collapses of the energy supply.
The persistent weakness of the market, resulting from the corrupt Shevardnadze adminis-
tration, created a climate of permanent uncertainty as regards government behavior and expecta-
tions. Economic success was highly dependent on the ability to mobilize political connections.
This is especially pertinent since integration into informal networks is the most distinct factor
with regard to life chances. Poverty neither correlated reliably with gender characteristics nor
with ethnic ancestry nor the level of education.96 With regard to the distribution of social power
resources, Georgia is identified on a medium level in Vanhanen’s Index of Power Distribution,
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ranking 78 out of 171 countries (see Table 3). Social inequality as expressed in the Gini Index is
surveyed by the UNDP. With 36.9 Georgia ranks on a similar level as Moldova, Laos, Nepal,
and Vietnam.97 Although this figure represents a medium rather than high level of inequality, the
high level of poverty is unequally distributed throughout the country, and is concentrated in geo-
graphically isolated areas and areas with a low density of arable land.
With regard to inflation and currency policy, Georgia has made some progress. The
Georgian Lari was introduced in September 1995. With the support of the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank this stimulated an economic recovery: inflation was sub-
dued98 and GDP started to grow—at least until the negative effects of the Russian financial crisis
in August 1998 (see Table 3). Macroeconomic stabilization was achieved through the sustainable
strengthening of the central bank and a reduction in new state indebtedness, which was accom-
plished in particular through international pressure.99 Nevertheless, overall Georgia exhibited the
characteristics of a classic developing country. The 2005 Human Development Index puts Geor-
gia’s development at 100 out of 177, on a level between Iran and Azerbaijan.100 While in 2004
Georgia was still considered to belong to the group of low-income countries, with average wages
ranging at only 74 per cent of the official subsistence minimum,101 it is now classified as a
medium-income country.102 In the countries of the former Soviet Union, including Georgia, tran-
sition brought about one of the deepest recessions since the Great Depression of the 1930s—and
in many cases, despite positive growth over the last few years, income is still lower than it was
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16 years ago. Since 1990, real per capita incomes have fallen by more than 40 per cent in Geor-
gia.103 More than 54 per cent of the population live below the poverty line.
Table 3: Selected Socioeconomic Indicators for Georgia, 1992 to 2003
Indicator 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Distribution of Social Power Resources
[Vanhanen Index] --- 6.6
a --- --- --- --- ---
Real GDP [change, %] 10.5 3.1 2.9 1.8 4.8 5.5 11.1
Overall Tax Revenue [% of GDP] 15.4 14.8 14.6 15 15.6 15.1 14.8
Overall Public Expenditure [% of GDP] 20.5 20.3 21 18.7 18.6 18.8 17.6
- on Education 2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2 1.8 1.6
- on Health Care 1.1 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7
Overall Budget Deficit [% of GDP] 4.6 4.9 5.5 3.4 2.3 3.4 2.3
External Debt [m US-$] 1412 1627 1635 1556 1602 1753 1853
Distribution of Income or Consumption [Gini







Unemployment Rate (official) 7.5 12.3 12.7 10.3 11.1 12.3 11.5
Poverty Line/Official Subsistence Minimum
[% of population below] 46.2 50.2 51.8 51.8 51.1 52.1 54.5
Alternative Poverty Line (Extreme Poverty) [%
of population below] 9.9 13.8 15.2 14.3 13.8 15.1 16.6









HDI rank [rank/number of surveyed countries] --- --- 85/174 70/174 76/162 81/173 88/175
a Georgia ranks 78 out of 171. In contrast to this, Germany ranks 157 out of 171 with a power resources value of
42.4; see www.fsd.uta.fi/english/data/catalogue/FSD1216/daf1216e.xls (accessed 9/2005).
b Data derived from annual issues of the Human Development Reports issued by the UNDP. For a comparison, the
data for Germany are given in round brackets.
c For a comparison, the data for Germany are in round brackets.
Source: UNDP, Millennium Development Goals in Georgia, Tbilisi, 2004, p. 19
According to a unified index of the World Health Organization (WHO),104 Georgia is not
among the worst offenders. However, out of the former Soviet republics, the performance of the
Georgian health care system ranks behind not only those of the Eastern European countries but
also behind those of Kazakhstan, the Ukraine, and Belarus.105 With regard to combined primary,
31
106 UNDP, Millennium Development Goals in Georgia, Tbilisi, 2004, p. 57, www.undp.org.ge/news/Georgiamdg.pdf
(accessed 12/2004).
107 See BTI 2005, p. 8, above (footnote 69).
secondary and tertiary education, Georgia has gained “world-class levels”106 and the country’s
education index (0.90) is comparable to ‘high development countries.’ However, the Georgian
education system needs to improve in order to sustain these figures in the long run. According to
the World Bank, it is unable to respond to demands imposed by the new market economy. Be-
sides, the continued absence of investment in infrastructure has caused major damage to schools
throughout the country. Table 3 gives an overview of the ‘welfare indicators’ for the period
between 1997 and 2003.
The level of socioeconomic development in Georgia remains remarkably low and is
therefore obstructive to the consolidation process. The high level of poverty is unequally distrib-
uted throughout the country and is concentrated in geographically isolated areas and areas with a
low density of arable land.107 An agricultural reform is needed in order to promote growth in this
sector which employs more than 50 per cent of the employable population.
3. Chances and Challenges for Democratic Consolidation in Georgia
As shown, the conditions surrounding Georgia’s process of democratic consolidation
have so far been very difficult. An analysis of the relevant factors provides a relatively negative
assessment of the situation—even after the Rose Revolution. This is reflected in Table 4 which
summarizes the occurrence of the indicators for the three core functions of the Georgian state as
well as the trend of their development after the change of government in November 2003.
Despite some successes, e.g., the re-integration of Ajara, the anti-corruption efforts, the
increase in public revenue, the reduction in the number of ministries, and the rise in the salaries
of public servants, conditions after the change of government still paint a rather ‘depressing’ pic-
ture. Although most of the existing obstacles are structural problems within the country in gen-
eral, rather than specific deficits of the current administration, the new elite controls both the
executive and the legislative bodies and, therefore, enjoys a favorable position with regard to the
implementation of an ambitious reform agenda. While the international donor community had
almost completely lost confidence in Shevardnadze by the end of his presidency, Saakashvili has
32
Table 4: The Three Core State Functions In Georgia






(1a) partial control over the state’s territory;
(1b) limited control over the external borders;
(1c) existence of two “frozen conflicts”;
(1d) existence of several militia especially relevant in the secession
conflicts;
(1e) impressive security sector reform;
(1f) high level of crime rates;













(2a) endemic corruption and systemic clientelism (low legal
legitimacy);
(2b) systemic election fraud under Shevardnadze, improvement
under Saakashvili (low legal legitimacy);
(2c) low support for the Shevardnadze regime, high but decreasing
support for the Saakashvili regime (medium political legitimacy);
(2d) civil liberties not fully granted (partly free);
(2e) political rights not fully granted (partly free);
(2f) political exclusion of certain groups (breakaway regions; ethnic
minorities);
(2g) low degree of independence of the judiciary;












(3a) medium distribution of social power resources
(3b) prolonged economic and/or monetary crises
(3c) low but increased level of tax and duty revenues
(3d) medium distribution of state expenditures
(3e) high level of external debts
(3f) medium level of equality in income or consumption; poverty
concentrated in geographically isolated areas
(3g) high rate of unemployment
(3h) low level of human development











a “0” means ‘no significant change’; “+” means ‘improvement’; “-” means ‘worsening of the situation.’
Source: author’s account
demonstrated openness to external assistance and a willingness to revive stalled reforms and, in
so doing, been rewarded with massive financial aid. This support as well as external efforts at
promoting democracy could be essential to Georgia’s further development since, in the light of
the geopolitical complexity of the situation, coupled with the lack of political and economic re-
sources for mastering old and new challenges, it is unlikely that Georgia will be able to achieve
its national goals without the strong support of the international community. On the other hand,
this orientation towards ‘Western’ organizations negatively affects relations with Russia, which
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is fearful of losing influence in its ‘near abroad’ (see Table 5 below). To irritate Russia would
have severe consequences. This has been emphatically displayed in a recent crisis between the
two neighbors in September and October 2006. The escalation to the verge of war was triggered
by Saakashvili’s provocative step of publicly playing out the arrest of four Russian military
officers for charges of espionage instead of quietly expelling them. Therefore, Russia’s decisive
role with regard to Georgia’s secession conflicts must be borne carefully in mind.
Table 4 points out that—even after the Rose Revolution that raised so much hope—the
deficits in the security function are not Georgia’s only problem. Therefore Saakashvili’s strat-
egy of stubbornly concentrating on its most prominent aspect—the secession conflicts—is
wrong. Although the re-integration of Ajara into the central state has been a success, and there
has also been some progress with regard to the fight against corruption as the second—inferiorly
treated—top priority, there are important downsides. The hard-line anti-corruption approach has
negatively affected civil liberties (see Table 5 below). What is even more, the imprudent inva-
sion of the conflict zone in South Ossetia almost resulted in a re-escalation to war in the summer
of 2004, as was also the case in the recent crisis with Russia in the fall of 2006. These downsides
are coupled with the fact that Saakashvili has concentrated on strengthening his presidential
powers. He is running the risk of becoming the ‘victim’ of a volatile public opinion if he does
not consolidate his power by creating stable institutions that would provide procedural legiti-
macy and be capable of mediating conflicts. This has already been the fate of first President
Gamsakhurdia, whose charismatic rule was based on rather fragile popular support. Once he lost
support, he was easily driven from office, despite his landslide victory in the presidential elec-
tions of May 1991. There are currently already indications that internal divisions exist within the
central government. Saakashvili has re-organized his cabinet several times in order to re-adjust
the balance of forces.
Georgia’s political system contains the paradox of a formally strong centralist presiden-
tial system that at the same time cannot extend its monopoly of power over the entire territory.
So far, the Saakashvili administration has failed to invest in establishing legitimate and coherent
institutions capable of reaching the periphery. Representatives on the local and regional level are
appointed by the central government. Administrative reform providing a comprehensive decen-
tralization policy is needed in order to empower local legislatures so they can fulfill their over-
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sight functions in the existing system of local self government. In that way, the central state
would not have to intervene permanently. With regard to minorities, an integration strategy
should be taken into account. Furthermore, it is advisable for Saakashvili to translate his charis-
matic legitimacy of rather vague popular support into a stable power base. A strengthening of the
independence of the judiciary and the rule of law would help to increase the people’s trust in
government institutions. Otherwise, Georgia remains vulnerable to destabilization by a sudden
shift in popular attitudes. The following table summarizes the chances and challenges of the
political dynamic that unfolded after the Rose Revolution.
Table 5: Chances and Challenges for Georgia’s Further Development
Chances Challenges
Role in ‘Rose Revolution’ could give new impetus to
civil society
‘Rose Revolution’ ‘monopolized’ and ‘brain drained’
civil society
New government’s commitment to fighting corruption,
one of Georgia’s most pressing problems
New government’s hard-line, anti-corruption approach
threatens civil liberties
Openness of new government to external support
provides new opportunities
‘Westernness’ of new political elites affects relations
with Russia which plays important role with regard to
secession conflicts
End of stagnation of democratization process after the
removal of the ailing Shevardnadze system
Potential destabilization after dissolving the old
structures of the Shevardnadze era
Impressive reform of the national security structures
aims at paving the way for NATO membership
Armament effort increase apprehensiveness of
breakaway region
Source: author’s compilation
The existence of two ‘frozen conflicts’ represents a serious obstacle to the ongoing pro-
cesses of state- and nation-building. Although it can be argued that a country cannot be democ-
ratized prior to the conclusion of such processes (see section 2.1), such an argument would justi-
fy any kind of setback in the transition towards consolidated democracy. Indeed, Tbilisi seems to
compensate for the existence of the separatist territories with the expansion of presidential
powers. But stability is not equal to strong ‘stateness’ in the sense of demonstrating executive
strength. In fact, there should be a balance between the different bodies of government, between
different interests, between center and periphery through the creation of stable institutions of
checks and balances, by building up strength in the sense of capacity in order to create a more
stable power base and to extend state authority to the periphery. The latter is most likely to be
achieved by a decentralization strategy. After all, the unfinished processes of state- and nation-
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building are not Georgia’s main constraints to further democratic consolidation. The more pres-
sing problems concern bad governance and the mismanagement of state capacities. Moreover, it
could be argued that promoting democracy contributes to nation-building. Participation, a core
element of democratic rule, would be a good example in this regard. In order to build up a
common identity, equal rights to participate in national political life ought to be created for all
communities in Georgia. Furthermore, a strengthening of the state is closely related to conflict
resolution since a weak state enables the perpetuation of the shadow economy and smuggling,
which, in turn, foster the interests of conflict entrepreneurs to maintain the status quo. In turn, a
state with a better performance would provide incentives for the breakaway republics to re-inte-
grate. Addressing state capacity in general could decrease the conflicts’ profitability and increase
the value of being part of a more prosperous Georgia. This could be achieved by tackling corrup-
tion and clientelism, where some progress has already been made, targeting social change and
strengthening civil society in addition to the promotion of good governance and the rule of law
in general.
But this is a long-term strategy and, as a matter of course, the settlement of Georgia’s
‘frozen conflicts’ even then is not that easy. To constructively ‘unfreeze’ them in the short-term
is unrealistic or even impossible after the recent crises that destroyed any residual confidence.
Therefore, in addition to a soft promoting-good-governance approach, long-term confidence-
building efforts are desperately needed.
However, as Table 5 shows, any approach—especially the building-up of mutual confi-
dence—would also have to take Russia into account. The non-violent resolution of the crisis in
Ajara—although significantly different from the secession conflicts—has shown the kind of
fruitful results a rapprochement between Tbilisi and Moscow can achieve. Thus, the interna-
tional community should help improve bilateral Georgian-Russian relations by providing incen-
tives for a co-operation with Russia. The EU, in particular, appears suited to this task although
its policies towards Georgia have so far been rather incoherent and unsystematic. Nevertheless,
the EU included the Southern Caucasus states in the European Neighborhood Policy and Georgia
has a strong interest in a closer co-operation with (and even accession to) the EU. Furthermore,
to engage and build a strategic partnership with Russia is one of the EU’s main objectives. While
the EU and Russia already co-operate on a variety of issues, including the modernization of Rus-
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sia’s economy, security issues, and questions of the environment, they have “every reason to step
up co-operation [… and] engage in many other areas, including the cooperation in the Southern
Caucasus.”108 Against this background, Europe should be more capable of taking a mediating
position, of providing incentives, and of conditioning assistance. Brussels is also experienced in
the promotion of good governance in the enlargement process and can build on that with regard
to the new neighborhood. However, the EU should not get directly involved in conflict resolu-
tion, as hoped for by Tbilisi. With the deadlocked situation in the conflict zones, there is no spe-
cific added value that Brussels could provide for the negotiation processes. It has already stepped
up its indirect role in the conflicts by financially supporting efforts made by the OSCE and the
UN and strengthened the mandate of its Special Representative for the South Caucasus. The EU
should therefore further strengthen the instruments already at its disposal and use them more
coherently instead of creating new ones. The OSCE and the UN should step up their cooperation
and coordination with other relevant internal and external actors like the Council of Europe.
